(DOWNLOAD) "Decosta v. Ye Craftsman Studio" by Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ~ Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Decosta v. Ye Craftsman Studio
- Author : Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
- Release Date : January 03, 1932
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 66 KB
Description
RUGG, C. J. The plaintiff, a minor, seeks to recover in this action of tort compensation for personal injuries received on October 28, 1929, as a result of being struck by an automobile owned by the defendant, insured by it under the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law, and operated by its agent. The writ is dated on January 26, 1931. 1. The first point for decision is whether the action was seasonably brought. The governing statutory provisions are G. L. c. 260, §§ 4, 7, 19. Said section 4 was amended by St. 1921, c. 319, § 1, St. 1925, c. 346, § 10, and St. 1929, c. 29, § 1 (see now St. 1931, c. 458, § 5), so as to read (so far as here material): '* * * Actions of tort for bodily injuries * * * the payment of judgments in which is required to be secured by chapter ninety * * * shall be commenced only within one year next after the cause of action accrues.' The relevant words of section 7 are: 'If the person entitled thereto is a minor * * * the action may be commenced within the time hereinbefore limited after the disability is removed.' Section 19 is in these words: 'If a special provision is otherwise made relative to the limitation of any action, any provision of this chapter inconsistent therewith shall not apply.' These sections are parts of the chapter of the General Laws devoted in general to the 'Limitation of Actions.' In the main that chapter governs the subject of limitations save as other special limitations may exist. These sections, considered by themselves and in connection with the scope of the chapter, are to be construed as constituting an harmonious entity. Thus interpreted, the terms of section 4 must be regarded as modified by section 7 in all cases where the facts render it relevant. Where, therefore, a minor is entitled to maintain any of the causes of action enumerated in section 4, the period of limitations within which such minor might commence the enforcement of his rights in the courts would be extended in accordance with the terms of section 7 as modified by special provisions, if any, as specified in section 19. If examination be made of the relevant sections of G. L. c. 260, alone, plainly the plaintiff would not be barred by section 4 but would be entitled to the benefit of section 7.